by Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman
It might be assumed that a “writer’s tricks” are about
fooling readers. For me, it’s about fooling myself.
New projects are intimidating, so I begin by telling myself
that I’m not a great writer, just a good one. I don’t have to be literary,
merely clear. I’m composing a new version of Fun With Dick and Jane
rather than the Great American Novel.
But I’m happy in retrospect, having just completed a new
work of American history, to find I can at least clear one bar.
Another blogger recently asked me to take the “Page 99” test
established by the great English poet, novelist, and literary critic Ford Madox
Ford. (His parents must have had that wacky British sense of humor.)
Ford famously said, "Open the book [any book] to page
ninety-nine and read, and the quality of the whole will be revealed to
you."
I fretted of course. What if page 99 of American Umpire
(released March 4 by Harvard University Press) was a blank sheet between
chapters, or worse, filled with the antlike footnotes that spell geek?
But I now feel I can look Ford in the eye at a
Bloomsbury soiree.
Turning to page 99 of American Umpire, I found the
dramatis personae all on stage in their customary poses. The year was 1823. The American president
(played in this scene by cleft-chinned James Monroe) worries that the United
States is unprepared for foreign threats. Craven Cabinet members echo and
amplify his fears. The Secretary of State (starring the prickly, gimlet-eyed
John Quincy Adams) suffers fools silently, if not gladly, and bides his time
before introducing the solution he knows will take others by surprise. Off
stage, British Foreign Minister George Canning is overheard in soliloquy,
plotting the grand strategy of the Pax Britannica.
On page 99 and throughout, American Umpire
re-examines the familiar terrain of U.S. foreign relations between 1776 and the
present, discovering new overlooks and hidden trails that reveal the nation’s
place on the terrain of world history.
The first thing it finds is that—contrary to many scholarly
and even casual critics—the United States is not an empire. Instead, because of
its unusual federal structure, the government has always functioned as a kind
of umpire, compelling states’ adherence to rules that gradually earned
collective approval.
On page 99, my umpire looks outside the domestic ballpark for the first time, and onto the international playing field. Uncle Sam must decide whether to join with Great Britain in defending the right of Spain’s colonies to declare independence. The larger question on Page 99 is whether America should guarantee “international security” to ensure its own–or not?
Here, friends, is Page 99. Tell me. Did I pass the test, or am I fooling myself again?
*****
American Umpire, by Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman (Harvard University Press)...
The offer was an
extraordinary compliment coming from the victor of Waterloo. For the first time
in its brief history, the United States was being asked to sign on to a
high-level international diktat. George Canning, foreign secretary of the
United Kingdom and America’s former adversary, courted Washington’s opinion.
Only the U.S.
secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, disagreed. He shrewdly waited until
others had vented their enthusiasm and then appealed to every politician’s soft
spot: vanity. Britain wanted to deter France and Spain from forcibly
re-imposing imperial control over the breakaway Latin republics. This was
splendid. Adams himself had acerbically lectured Britain’s minister in
Washington that “the whole system of modern colonization is an abuse of
government and it is time that it should come to an end.” But America ought to
proudly issue its own preemptive declaration, he said, rather than rowing
behind the Royal Navy. “It would be more candid, as well as more dignified,”
Adams observed, “to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France than to
come in as a cock-boat in the wake of a British man-of-war.” Actually, it would
have been more candid for the United States to acknowledge that the whole idea
of a public protest had been England’s from the start.
By the end of the long
afternoon, Monroe was nearly persuaded. The president certainly did not wish to
be seen as deferring to the United Kingdom, not after the United States had
just lost 2,200 men defending its honor on land and sea in the War of 1812. Not
after the carpenters and painters had just finished restoring the burned-out
shell of the White House, torched by British troops in 1814. But with the
weight of the country on his shoulders, Monroe remained anxious that Spain,
France, and Russia might send as many as 10,000 troops to quell republicanism
in the Americas. He could not quite bring himself to adopt Adams’s breezy
self-confidence. Britain was the only country equipped to stop the menacing
European powers. Prudence counseled acceptance of its offer.
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674055476
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